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Introduction 
 
The labeling of genetically modified foods (GMFs) is a topic of debate — a debate whose 
outcome could dramatically alter the structure of the U.S. and international food industry. Recent polls 
have emphasized that a majority of U.S. consumers desire GMFs to be labeled (CNN 1999, Time 1999, 
Pew 2001a, Hallman and Metcalfe 1995) and legislation has been entered at both the federal and state 
levels. For example, H.R. 3377 and S. 2080 the “Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Acts” were 
introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, respectively. In addition, at least seven 
states are currently debating nine different labeling and marketing requirements for GMFs (Pollack 2001). 
The current lack of harmonization of policy across countries also makes GMF labeling an 
international trade issue. The U.S. and Canada do not require GMFs to be labeled unless the GMF is 
significantly different than the conventional food or the GMF presents a health concern. However, many 
other countries are requiring GMFs to be labeled. For example, the EU, Australia, and New Zealand 
require labeling if a food contains more than one percent GM ingredients (with important exceptions for 
some foods, e.g., foods served in restaurants). Japan’s policy is similar except its threshold before labeling 
is required is five percent (Bernauer 2001). Currently, Taiwan and Hong Kong are moving to implement 
labeling rules similar to Japan’s and China recently issued regulations that appear to require all GM-foods 
to be labeled (AgBiotech Reporter 2001). 
GMF labeling is a prime example of a quick moving policy area where individual countries are 
not willing to take the time necessary for development of international consensus on the best approaches. 
The strategy is to regulate now and worry about harmonization later. The record of discord and gridlock 
in the relevant Codex Alimentarius committees reinforces the "everyone for themselves" approach. 
                                                 
3This paper was originally presented at the 2nd World Congress of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Monterey, California, June 2002. 
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The debate surrounding the labeling of GMFs is largely framed as how much information should 
be supplied to consumers to facilitate effective choice and how that information should be supplied. The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) position on how much information should be supplied 
occupies one end of the spectrum in this debate. It says that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (by which 
FDA obtains legal authority for the labeling of foods) requires food labels to “disclose information that is 
material to representations made or suggested about the product and consequences that may arise from the 
use of the product” (CFSAN 1999). Under its substantial equivalence approach, FDA has interpreted this 
to mean that labeling is not required for most GMFs and, furthermore, that voluntary labeling of the 
nonuse of biotechnology may be misleading to consumers (CFSAN 200x). This policy can be 
characterized as a ‘need to know,’ or perhaps more accurately a ‘do not need to know,’ policy. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the “right to know” position where all products using 
biotechnology are required to be labeled. Under H.R. 3377, for example, GMFs would be required to 
exhibit a label saying: 
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Proponents of thi
engineered. For e
food they purcha
position focuses 
consumption, but
The flow
of markets. In a 
goods feature an 
product?) into o
consumers to ma
  THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS OR WAS PRODUCED WITH A 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MATERIALs including the EU, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are using this approach. 
s alternative usually state that a consumer has a ‘right to know’ that a food is genetically 
xample, H.R. 3377 explicitly states, “consumer’s [sic] have a right to know whether the 
se contains or was produced with genetically modified material”. The right-to-know 
not on an intrinsic attribute of the product, or necessarily on the private effects of product 
 on the process attribute of how the product was produced. 
 of information among market participants plays a critical role in the efficient operation 
broad sense, labeling and marketing have the ability to convert a market in which all 
attribute that consumers cannot observe (e.g., was biotechnology used in producing this 
ne that can be learned prior to purchase. From a policy perspective, labeling allows 
ke choices match their preferences. From a business perspective, labeling allows firms 
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that use (or don’t use) particular techniques to gain market share and maximize any value-added rents. 
Most fundamentally, disagreement about labeling policy is about whether increased information on the 
use of biotechnology will improve consumer choice and market function and at what cost. 
Here, we explore the operation of possible labeling approaches to GMFs and use a cost-benefit 
framework to evaluate alternatives. We argue that both the substantial equivalence (FDA) and right-to-
know positions have limitations because each focuses on only a particular attribute of the food. Given the 
multi-attribute nature of many genetic modifications, and the relatively low degree of knowledge and 
understanding of genetic engineering, consumers are likely to desire information about the range of 
possible benefits and risks associated with GMFs. 
 
What GMF Labeling Does and Doesn’t Do 
The central function of labeling is to communicate to consumers about the quality attributes of a 
product. The use of biotechnology in food production can have multidimensional effects on product 
quality. For example, it affects intrinsic process attributes (e.g., how was this product produced) and may 
affect search attributes such as color and size, experience attributes such as use characteristics, and other 
credence attributes such as nutritional content or presence of pesticide residues (Caswell 2000). 
Consumers may want or regulators may believe they need to know about some or all of the changes in 
product attributes brought about by the use of biotechnology. 
Studies of consumer acceptance of GMFs tend to identify two groups: those that accept or are 
indifferent to GMFs and those who reject them. In terms of quality information needed, those consumers 
who wish to reject or select products based solely on the use of biotechnology need only labeling that 
allows them to make this distinction. Other consumers may have a generally rejecting or accepting view 
of GMFs but their purchase decision will be influenced by other quality attributes associated with 
competing products and price. Yet other consumers have no concerns about GMF status and will focus 
only on comparing other quality attributes between GMFs and conventional products. For the latter two 
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groups, a labeling program that simply communicates whether biotechnology was used will likely provide 
inadequate information or be irrelevant. 
The primary function of GMF labeling to date has been to turn a credence attribute regarding the 
process of production into a yes/no search attribute that can be learned before purchase. The consumer’s 
ultimate purchase decision will be influenced by the yes/no GMF labeling, any additional explanatory 
labeling provided, direct observation of product attributes, and prior experience with use of the product. 
The yes/no message about the use of biotechnology can be delivered to consumers through 
different means. So-called “positive” mandatory labeling requires companies to tell consumers when 
biotechnology has been used in production or when cross-contamination from bioengineered products is 
above a defined threshold. In this case, the absence of labeling may communicate that a product is not a 
GMF. In contrast, so-called “negative” voluntary labeling allows companies to tell consumers that their 
product is non-GMF, again if it meets standards for such a claim. In this case, the absence of a label may 
indicate that the product is GMF. The qualifier may is necessary in the above sentences because unless 
labeling is symmetric (i.e., absence and presence are both labeled) what consumers assume about the 
unlabeled product is a matter for empirical inquiry. Expanding labeling to communicate beyond the 
yes/no level gives rise to a further array of issues regarding what is communicated and how consumers 
perceive the message. 
The central questions for labeling programs are two-fold. First, to what extent do they provide 
benefits by improving consumer decision making, and by extension consumer welfare, and for which 
consumers? Second, what is the cost of providing those benefits given that any labeling program must be 
supported by a set of standards, actions to meet the standards, certification of the actions, and 
governmental enforcement of the program? The balance of benefits to costs is affected by technology 
(e.g., testing techniques) and may change over time. For example, it appears that one of the reasons some 
consumers want GMFs labeled is due to uncertainties about long-term health and environmental effects 
(Teisl et al. 2002). With time, consumers’ perceived uncertainty about these long-term effects (and, 
presumably, the associated benefits of labeling) may decline. 
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 What Are the Benefits of Labeling? 
The benefits of providing product specific information can be measured by its ability to inform 
consumers as to the positive and negative attributes of the product. When product information is well 
understood and credible, then consumers’ choices match their preferences and dollars spent are in-line 
with any underlying willingness to pay for the bundle of attributes received. Firms that produce goods 
with desirable attributes also gain as they are rewarded for providing those attributes. However, the 
benefit of labeling depends upon the type of attributes considered. In general, labeling is increasingly 
beneficial, as attributes become more costly or difficult for a consumer to independently assess (Caswell 
and Mojduszka 1996). For example, most individuals can identify the color of a product rather easily 
while verifying that a food was not genetically modified would be difficult. 
The aggregate benefit of a labeling policy will also depend upon the relative importance the 
information has to consumers. In general, benefits are maximized if either 1) the information is important 
to a large number of consumers, even if the information may be of relatively small importance to each 
consumer or 2) the information is extremely important for even a small number of consumers (e.g., 
disclosure of peanut ingredients to those who have a life-threatening allergy to peanuts). 
Policies that allow consumers to make purchase decisions match their preferences are inherently 
desirable, whether the attributes concern end-use characteristics (e.g., the consistency of flour used in 
baking) or process attributes (e.g., whether genetically modified grain was used in making the flour) – so 
long as these policies are not too costly. Thus, there is no a priori reason for FDA to limit its labeling 
policy, as it currently does, to only product attributes and the private consequences of product 
consumption. In fact, other federal labeling programs focus on disclosing information about process 
attributes (e.g., organic labels, irradiation) or the public consequences (e.g., dolphin-safe labeling of 
canned tuna) of product consumption.  
Until recently, there has been little empirical evidence identifying the benefits of labeling GMFs. 
Golan and Kuchler (2000) and Golan, Kuchler, and Crutchfield (2000) use economic intuition and 
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estimated supply and demand parameters from previous studies4 to estimate the welfare impacts of GMF 
labeling. In their analysis, they assume consumers are differentiated by whether they want to avoid GMFs 
(or are indifferent between non-GMFs and GMFs). They also assume the genetic modification only 
provides benefits to consumers by lowering GM food prices (the genetic modification reduces the costs of 
production). They then compare market and surplus changes due to the institution of a labeling program 
in two different situations. In the first situation, the labeling program is costless; in turn, it is not 
surprising that instituting a labeling program is necessarily welfare enhancing. Labeling leads to 
improvements in consumer surpluses for those consumers who don’t care to avoid the technology 
(because they enjoy greater price reductions once labeling is imposed). In addition, labeling increases the 
welfare of individuals who want to avoid GMFs by allowing them to do so. Under this scenario they 
estimate a net consumer welfare gain of $76 million for the introduction and labeling of genetically 
modified soybeans. 
In the second situation, the labeling program is no longer costless. Golan and her coauthors 
provide a list of examples showing where labeling and product differentiation may be costly and note that 
these are all due to the ‘production externalities’ caused by having GMFs in the market. Their list of 
externalities include such items as: non-GM crops being cross-pollinated by neighboring GM crops, 
increased resistance development in non-targeted insects and weeds, maintenance of separate storage and 
transportation facilities, and certification/testing costs.5 They then assume that all of these costs fall solely 
on the non-GMF market.6 Under this situation labeling leads to improvements in consumer surpluses for 
those consumers who are indifferent to the technology. However, because labeling is now costly, the 
introduction of GMFs and the imposition of labeling can lead to reductions in the welfare of individuals 
                                                 
4 Falck-Zepeda, Traxler and Nelson (2000); and Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) looked at changes in 
welfare due to the introduction of GM soybeans; they did not estimate welfare effects due to labeling. 
5 Although the first two items are externalities the second two are not. They are just the cost of instituting a labeling 
program; these latter costs can occur with any labeling program, even those without externalities. 
6 This assumption is not realistic. Note that some externalities may be faced by both GM and non-GM producers 
(e.g., increased resistance in weeds) and others will depend upon the property rights of growers (e.g., who will be 
forced to incorporate buffer strips to reduce cross-pollination). Further, who pays the labeling program costs will be 
dependent upon the structure of the program. 
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who want to avoid GMFs. This is due to these consumers having to pay more for the same non-GM foods 
that they initially obtained at a lower cost. Further, as the proportion of consumers who prefer non-GM 
foods grows, the relative size of the consumer welfare loss due to higher non-GMF prices begin to 
outweigh the gains due to the lower GMF prices. They indicate that if 25 percent of the market prefers 
non-GMFs, then losses to consumers may outweigh gains. Under this scenario they estimate a net 
consumer welfare loss of $21 million. 
Bullock and Desquilbet (2001) obtain results similar to those of Golan, Kuchler and Crutchfield 
(2000), in that they indicate that anti-GMF consumers are made worse off by the appearance of GM 
technology if labeling is imposed. Although they are able to avoid consuming GMFs the segregation and 
identity preservation costs cause them to pay more for food than if GMFs had never appeared. However, 
unlike Golan, Kuchler, and Crutchfield, individuals who are indifferent between GMFs and non-GMFs 
may also lose because they may pay higher food prices than they would otherwise, due to the increased 
costs of labeling and segregation. 
The above results hinge critically on several factors. First is the assumption made about the 
structure of the labeling program, which is assumed to be voluntary. Second, the structure of the problem 
assumes that there are only two types of consumers, those who want to avoid GMFs and those who are 
indifferent. This is tied to the assumption that the genetic modification only provides benefits to 
consumers by lowering prices; i.e., the studies do not look at situations where the individuals may derive 
a non-price benefit. However, the bottom line of these two studies support the central thesis here that the 
imposition of a labeling program for GMFs should depend upon a careful weighing of the benefits and 
costs associated with a specific program. 
Lusk et al. (2001) and Huffman et al. (2002) used experimental auction methods to elicit 
consumers’ willingness to pay for GMFs. The Lusk study used a sample of students at Kansas State 
University and found they were unwilling to pay a premium for non-GM corn chips. Huffman et al. used 
a randomly recruited sample of individuals from two urban areas (Des Moines, IA and St. Paul, MN) and 
found that consumers were willing to pay about a 14 percent premium for food items (vegetable oil, 
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tortilla chips, and potatoes) they perceived as non-GM (the GMFs were labeled as being genetically 
modified). 
McClusky et al (2001) and Boccaletti and Moro (2000) used survey approaches (contingent 
valuation) to estimate the willingness to pay for or to avoid GMFs. McClusky et al. used an intercept 
sample of Japanese consumers and, similar to Lusk et al. and Huffman et al., studied consumer reactions 
to GMs that only reduced the price of the food (as opposed to altering another product attribute). They 
found that Japanese consumers would be willing to pay to avoid GMFs; that is, consumers would only be 
willing to purchase GM noodles or tofu if there was a 60 percent discount. The Boccaletti and Moro study 
is different, in that they looked at Italians’ willingness to pay for GM foods with enhanced attributes 
(reduced use of pesticides, improved nutritional or organoleptic characteristics, or longer shelf life). They 
found that a majority of consumers would be willing to pay up to 10 percent more for these GM foods. 
The experimental and survey results again are not necessarily surprising. Consumers are not 
willing to pay more for a new technology (that because it is new is almost necessarily associated with 
long-term effects that are, from the consumers point of view7, uncertain), without being provided an 
incentive to do so. That is, consumers faced with a potential long-term cost will reject a technology unless 
they perceive themselves as obtaining some sort of benefit. Again, the bottom line of these studies 
supports the central thesis here. 
 
What Are the Costs of Labeling? 
As with benefit estimates, the costs of labeling programs are highly dependent upon the particular 
labeling program being considered. Labeling programs require standard setting, private compliance and 
certification efforts, and public enforcement oversight. Typically the costs of the actual physical labeling 
(e.g., label design and printing) are a tiny fraction of the costs of compliance and certification (supply 
chain costs), particularly if the transition time to the new labeling regime is at least a period of months. 
                                                 
7 Teisl et al (2002) indicate that many focus group participants, when notified of the prevalence of GMFs, were 
comforted; participants combined the fact that GM-foods are prevalent with the notion that they had not heard or 
known of anyone getting sick as positive news. 
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Other costs may include the costs to public authorities of monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
labeling regimes, the costs of trade impacts from labeling programs, costs arising from possible changes 
in market structures, and costs from the dilution of information already included on labels (n/e/r/a/ 2001). 
As an example of the latter potential cost, labeling may impose cognitive costs on some 
consumers. Simply increasing the amount of information content on a label may actually decrease the 
consumer’s ability to process other more important label information (Scammon 1977, Roe, Levy, and 
Derby 1999). In addition, requiring specific information to be placed on a label imposes a cost in that the 
limited space on the product label could have been devoted to other, potentially more useful and 
important information. For example, almost twice as many Americans say they would rather have 
information about pesticide residues placed on a food label rather than information about GMFs (CSPI 
2001). Because information content is competing for valuable space on the label, labeling requirements 
should be justified in terms of the importance of the required information. A prescription such as “more 
information is better” does not necessarily characterize an optimal labeling policy. 
Costs are difficult to measure, particularly because many labeling policies are newly 
implemented, in the process of being implemented, or at the proposal stage. Perhaps as importantly, the 
introduction of GMFs is taking place in a dynamic international market in which shifts in sources of 
supply and the move from a commodity to an identity preserved orientation are ongoing. This makes it 
challenging to isolate the impacts and costs of labeling programs, and associated attitudes toward GMFs. 
Work by Ballenger et al. (2000) indicates the type of price and trade flow analysis necessary to begin to 
disentangle these effects. As a result of this difficulty, most studies focus on particular supply chain costs 
of labeling. The exception is the n/e/r/a (2001) study done in the United Kingdom that attempts to 
measure a broad range of benefits and costs of different options for extending the EU’s current labeling 
program. 
It is important to acknowledge that many believe that much more is at stake in program adoption 
than the incremental costs, however significant, of a particular labeling regime. They think that labeling 
policy, particularly mandatory labeling of GMFs, fronts for an entire agricultural, food, and trade agenda 
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whose ultimate goal is the widespread rejection of GM food technology. In other words, they fear that 
labeling will be the tipping factor regarding whether biotechnology succeeds in the world market. This 
helps to explain why labeling is such a salient issue worldwide. 
Measuring Costs 
A number of reports have been published recently that attempt to quantify the cost of labeling for 
GMFs or non-GMFs. They largely focus on the supply chain costs of compliance under particular 
labeling programs. Several important determinants of these costs are: 
• What products are labeled? 
 
o No labeling. 
o Mandatory labeling of GMFs. 
 Triggered by a lack of substantial equivalence. 
 Required for all GMFs. 
o Mandatory labeling of non-GMFs. 
o Voluntary labeling of GMFs. 
o Voluntary labeling of non-GMFs. 
o Combinations of the above (e.g., mandatory labeling of all GMFs, voluntary 
labeling of non-GMFs). 
 
• How are GMF and non-GMF defined? 
 
o Products with or without GM DNA or proteins in finished product. 
o Products produced or not produced with the use of biotechnology. 
o Products from animals fed or not fed with GM products. 
 
• What tolerances are used for GMF presence? 
 
o Tolerance (e.g., in % terms) for adventitious presence. 
o Chain of custody without % tolerance. 
 
• What level of supply chain quality assurance system is needed for labeling? 
 
o Segregation 
o Identity preservation 
 Traceability 
 
• What must be labeled? 
 
o Packaged consumer products. 
o Bulk consumer products. 
o Prepared foods in restaurant, takeout, and institutional settings. 
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These determinants are closely intertwined. For example, a labeling program that mandates 
labeling of all GMFs when GM DNA or proteins are present in the finished product, with a 1% tolerance 
level, could be complied with by a system of keeping inputs separate and testing final products. On the 
other hand, mandatory labeling of all finished products where biotechnology has been used in the 
production system requires labeling of a broader range of products and a more comprehensive system of 
product tracking. In general, non-GMF labeling is likely to require higher levels of quality assurance 
because it is assuring the absence rather than the presence of GM use. 
A key determinant of the impact of a labeling policy, particularly if it is mandatory, is the 
treatment of products from animals fed with GM crops. For example, to date the EU policy has not 
required the labeling of such products as GMFs, meaning that the feed grain sector has not needed to 
control GM status, except where buyers demand non-GM feeds. A shift in policy on this point would 
have a large impact of the proportion of sales for which GM status would have to be controlled. 
While the terminology is still evolving (n/e/r/a 2001, United Kingdom Food Standards Agency 
2002, Golan et al. 2002, Lin et al. 2000, Shoemaker et al. 2001), two basic types of supply chain quality 
assurance systems may be used to comply with different types of labeling programs. The first is a 
segregation system where GM and/or non-GM products are kept physically separated and tracked. 
Segregation systems frequently rely on testing to verify GM status. The second system is identity 
preservation (IP), which typically involves more stringent separation of products and more precise 
tracking. While IP systems may use testing to verity GM status, they also are capable of assuring GM 
status where testing is not useable or reliable through establishing a chain of custody for the product 
similar to that used for organic labeling. 
“Traceability” is the ability to trace a product through all stages of production and distribution. A 
traceability system is defined by the attribute(s) being traced (e.g., product origin, production practices, 
processing) and the degree to which detailed information is communicated along the supply chain (i.e., 
internal versus external traceability (United Kingdom Food Standards Agency 2002)). While segregation 
systems employ traceability, in regulatory and industry parlance “traceability” is coming to be reserved 
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for more advanced and detailed systems of attribute tracking. As such, it is associated with IP systems and 
is particularly important for tracking attributes for which testing is difficult or impossible. In fact, a UK 
study defines IP as a generic term that encompasses both segregation and traceability (n/e/r/a 2001). 
Studies of the supply chain costs of assuring GM status report their results in terms of monetary 
cost per unit (e.g., cents per bushel), percentage cost per unit (e.g., 2% of price), or aggregate costs for the 
entire product flow being considered. While the cost per unit measures may be of most direct interest to 
industry, the aggregate costs of compliance are needed in any overall evaluation of benefits and costs. 
Because data are lacking, the precision of the estimates appears to be best for the cost per unit analysis 
and less precise for the aggregate estimates. 
Lin et al. (2000) estimated the monetary costs per unit of segregating nonbiotech crops along the 
marketing chain from the country elevator through subterminal and export elevators, working from cost 
estimates made by Bender et al. (1999) for the handling of specialty corn and soybeans. Non-GM status is 
assumed to be assured through testing. They estimate rough ballpark figures as an added marketing cost 
of about $0.22/bushel for corn and $0.54/bushel for soybeans, both not including any premium paid to the 
producer. Lin et al. conclude that while “the costs are not small, they do not imply that disarray would 
occur in the grain marketing system if nonbiotech crops were handled on a larger scale (p. 32).” 
Several studies evaluate the costs of IP systems. Kalaitzandonakes (Pew 2001b) cites results from 
Buckwell et al. (1998) that IP systems to assure GM quality traits raised the price of soybeans by 0.6-
1.3%, while providing GM traceability for oilseed rape (canola) raised prices by 2.8 to 4.1%. Vandeberg 
et al. (2000) estimated the aggregate costs of identity preservation of non-GM crops in the Eastern Corn 
Belt of the United States. While the authors refer to the quality assurance system as IP, it is not clear how 
the system evaluated would differ from the segregation system described by Lin et al. The Vandeberg et 
al. study does differ, however, in including analysis of the cost impact for the marketing of all corn and 
soybeans resulting from the need to provide IP for non-GM corn and soybeans. 
The Vandeberg study used a linear programming approach to minimize the total variable costs 
(including elevator handling cost, elevator segregation cost, transportation cost from farmer to elevator 
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and elevator to end-user, and elevator storage cost) of moving grain through the market system to the end 
user receiving pit. Four scenarios were evaluated: 1) commodity corn and soybeans only; 2) in-house 
segregation at the elevator level of commodity corn (35%), non-GM corn (65%), commodity soybeans 
(55%), and non-GM soybeans (45%), with low segregation costs; 3) the same scenario as #2 with 
segregation costs doubled, and 4) segregation by elevator with designated elevators receiving only IP 
grains. Surprisingly, the authors assume that in the fourth scenario the IP elevators do not incur 
segregation costs. It is not clear how non-GM status would be assured at these elevators without testing or 
other verification efforts. In the IP scenarios (2-4), Vandeberg et al. found that the total costs of the 
system increase from 3-9% over the base case (scenario 1), with costs being highest where all elevators 
potentially handle all crops and segregation costs are high (scenario 3). The other two scenarios have 
costs at the lower end of the range, with dedicated elevators showing the lowest cost increase, albeit with 
no segregation costs. 
Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000) estimated the costs of IP at the elevator level for high 
oil corn (not a GM product) at a 5% purity level, focusing on a broader range of cost impacts including 
coordination, logistical, and opportunity costs. They estimated costs for three case elevators using a 
process and economic simulation model, with multiple scenarios of bin filling schedules, crop-to-bin 
assignments, incoming volumes, and other parameters. The authors find that opportunity costs (e.g., grind 
margin loss, losses from underutilization of capacity), a category of costs not included in many analyses, 
are the dominant cost associated with IP. While not directly a GM example, the work of Maltsbarger and 
Kalaitzandonakes suggests the importance of evaluating all the costs associated with a change to IP 
operation. The authors also suggest that costs rise nonlinearly as the threshold for purity is decreased. 
Bullock et al (2000) estimated the costs of segregation and IP from the seed through the farm, 
transportation to the country elevator, the country elevator, and the export elevator for soybeans. They 
note that maintaining a very low GM content requires two efforts at each stage in the vertical chain: 
making sure the grain purchased is non-GM and preventing contamination with GM product before 
selling to the next stage. The IP system evaluated depends on testing to verify that these efforts have been 
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successful. Working from cost figures and current market premiums for non-GM soybeans, the authors 
found that it must be costing handlers and exporters combined less than $11/metric ton to implement IP 
for non-GM soybeans, of which about $1 is testing costs. Thus $10/metric ton must cover the 
inefficiencies introduced into the system by doubling the potential number of crops handled, as well as 
profits They concluded that the major cost from IP comes from less flexibility in grain handling and the 
need to reshuffle the handling system. Bullock et al. argue that the introduction of IP will bring forth a 
gradual overhaul of the grain handling system, with radical change being unlikely. This raises the 
important issue of short versus long run costs of system transition, which is not accounted for in most 
studies to date. 
Gustafson (2002) estimated the costs of IP production at the farm level, using production of 
certified seed as an example. He stresses the need to count all costs, including opportunity costs of 
forgone or restricted activities, for example in fields adjacent to those with the IP crop. His estimated IP 
cost was $4.68/bushel. 
Some aggregate analyses of the costs of GM labeling programs are available. A study for the 
Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) by KPMG (1999) found the cost of the proposed 
mandatory labeling program to be 6% of turnover (sales) in the first year of implementation and 3% in 
subsequent years. ANZFA rejected these estimates, arguing that the KPMG study assumed a much more 
elaborate system of private certification/testing and government oversight than would be required. An 
updated economic and financial assessment was presented in 2000 (KPMG 2000). It estimated that the 
one-off or set up costs would be 0.43% of sales in Australia and 0.23% of sales in New Zealand, with on-
going annual costs at 0.26% of sales in Australia and .0026% in New Zealand. It also estimated on-going 
consequential ingredient costs associated with substitution of non-GM ingredients at 0.51% of sales in 
Australia and 0.19% in New Zealand. Based on a metanalysis of cost studies, the European Commission 
(2000) estimated the overall costs of IP for its current GM labeling program to increase the cost of grain 
by 6-17% compared to its farm gate price. A KPMG (2001) study for Canada is reported to have 
estimated an increase in retail food prices of as much as 10% and of producer prices by 35-41%. 
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That the studies to date return differing estimates of the supply chain costs of GM labeling is not 
at all surprising given the differing sections of the supply chain covered, the different types of cost 
considered, and the different assumptions made in modeling costs. However, the studies discussed above 
have one thing in common; they all focus on the costs of IP for non-GMFs under a labeling program 
where GM is defined by the presence of GM DNA or proteins in the labeled product at a particular 
tolerance (usually 1%). This is essentially the current labeling system in the EU. Despite this 
commonalty, the estimates still range from very modest to significant increases in costs. It is our view that 
much more leverage could be gained on the cost issue through studies that carefully distinguish between 
short and long run costs. While the costs of transition are important, they should not overwhelm the 
consideration of underlying costs after a period of adjustment, which are likely to be considerably lower. 
 
Upping the Ante: The New Custody Fight 
Fireworks have been going off in the labeling and trade arena since last year when the European 
Commission (2001/0180 (COD)) proposed to make changes in its regulatory regime for GMFs. These 
changes up the ante in regard to IP by broadening the coverage of GM products and introducing a 
requirement of traceability that would mandate some level of chain of custody information for GM 
products. Under the proposal, traceability would be required for GMOs and food and feed products 
produced from GMOs. The inclusion of feed is a new feature of the proposal. In addition, it brings 
products that are produced from but do not contain genetically modified organisms into the system. Thus 
IP systems would need to be extended to products such as soybean oil, soy lecithin, and corn gluten, 
which do not retain evidence of GM usage in the final product in the form of DNA or proteins. The 
proposal would require that operators have in place systems and procedures to identify to whom and from 
whom products are made available, transmit specified information concerning the identity of a product in 
terms of the individual GMOs it contains or whether it is produced from GMOs, and retain specified 
information for a period of five years and make it available to competent authorities on demand. These 
major proposed changes are related. For example, with the original GM definition, the labeling system 
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could be enforced through sampling and laboratory testing (n/e/r/a 2001). With the addition of foods 
made from GMOs, a traceability, or chain of custody system, is the only means of assuring GM-status. 
While exactly what will be entailed in the required traceability systems is not yet clear, it is clear 
that these systems will be more expensive than segregation or IP systems without strict traceability. They 
will be more expensive because they require tracking of a broader range of products to a higher degree. 
As a result, nearly all of the cost studies done to date are not directly applicable to the EC proposal. An 
exception is a n/e/r/a study (2001) that specifically evaluated the costs associated with alternative 
extensions of the EU GM labeling scheme. The study’s estimated cost for an option similar to the 
proposed rule is 725 million pounds compared to the base case (current regulation) of 96 million pounds. 
While expensive, other more stringent options were estimated to cost up to twice as much. 
Other less well-documented estimates of impacts are available in the press. The Food Traceability 
Report (June 2001) quotes an unidentified USDA official as estimating the EU proposal could cost 
American producers $4 billion in lost exports. The proposal has been roundly condemned by the United 
States and Canada, and strongly questioned by Australia. The EC argues that traceability is needed to 
provide consumers with information they clearly demand. While saying that costs are difficult to estimate, 
the EC argues that the requirements for traceability of GMOs mirror those in place or being put in place 
for other products. They state that the required transmission and retention of information could largely be 
incorporated into existing systems and should not imply significant extra costs. In any case, the EC 
proposal for traceability of GM products makes the cost picture less clearly defined and calls for yet a 
new set of studies. 
 
Comparing Benefits and Costs 
Labeling, like most regulation, may hinder the dynamics of a market for years to come because 
coordination difficulties and bureaucratic fixity cannot react to the rapidly changing needs of the 
marketplace. Thus, it is not only possible that the lack of an information policy may restrict the 
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development of markets but that the presence of an information policy may restrict their development. As 
a result, design of labeling policies should be closely reasoned. 
Under the benefit-cost paradigm, the US FDA’s policy of substantial equivalence may be justified 
because the existing scientific evidence has not shown any substantial health or safety difference between 
GM and non-GM foods. With no differences in health and safety, the benefits of a labeling policy may be 
less than the costs. However, since benefit measures are ultimately closely tied to the perceptions of 
consumers, the FDA policy may ignore other reasons for labeling (e.g., environmental, unresolved 
anxiety) that could generate benefits for consumers. 
On the other hand, the ‘right to know’ position is also limited. Taken to the extreme, all product 
attributes, no matter how unimportant and no matter how small the concerned market segment, would 
have to be disclosed. A decision to impose labels should recognize both their benefits and costs. This is 
particularly true with mandatory labeling approaches; under voluntary approaches the individuals who 
bear the costs are the same individuals who reap the benefits of the program. Mandatory labeling 
approaches place the cost burden on everyone, irrespective of whether they obtain any benefits from the 
information (Caswell 2000). 
Currently there is one study that attempts to measure the overall benefits and costs of alternative 
labeling policies (n/e/r/a 2001) but it analyzes a limited number of alternatives with the current EU 
labeling system as the base case. There is consumer research for other labeling policies that helps 
illustrate the factors that increase the potential benefits of labeling. Labeling programs that present the 
greatest potential to provide benefits provide information that is both valuable and ‘new’ to consumers. 
Further, the information must be understood and seen as credible by consumers. Finally, the information 
must be useful to consumers when making product decisions (i.e., the information must allow the 
consumer to differentiate across products). By all indications, even a simple GM label would provide new 
information to consumers. However, a simple GMF label would provide important information only to 
consumers who want to avoid GMFs simply because of the genetic-engineering process. In a recent 
survey, this type of information was not seen as important by a significant portion of the population 
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(CSPI 2001). Although a majority of U.S. consumers stated they want labeling of GMFs, only a small 
fraction felt strongly about this and only a minority was willing to accept even a small rise in food prices 
to allow for this labeling. 
For the U.S. case, we wonder to what extent a simple GMF label would be understood or be seen 
as credible by many consumers. Currently, the majority of U.S consumers feel they are not well informed 
about the issues surrounding GMFs (IFIC 1999); they also do not understand the concepts related to 
GMFs (Hoban 1999; Pew 2001a; CSPI 2001). This is not surprising given that Americans frequently do 
not even understand the concepts related to traditional plant and animal hybridization (Hallman and 
Metcalfe 1995). In addition, simple labels seem to be the least credible type of label (Teisl and O’Brien 
2001) and consumers are the least satisfied with the amount of information provided by simple labels 
(Teisl and O’Brien 2001, Roe et al. 2001). 
A simple GMF label would be of most use to consumers who want to select or avoid a product 
based on its GM status, or who are knowledgeable enough to associate a yes/no message with underlying 
product attributes. For other consumers, simple labels could be of limited usefulness because they only 
allow a yes/no differentiation. Given that genetic engineering can produce a wide variety of 
‘consequences’ and that peoples’ perceptions of the desirability of GMFs is highly dependent upon those 
consequences (Hallman and Metcalfe 1995), simple GMF labels are not likely to allow most consumers to 
differentiate products in the manner they most desire. When making food choices a consumer may want 
to know whether the food contains allergens (or alternatively, has had allergens removed), whether the 
food contains higher than normal levels of anti-oxidants, or whether the food’s production entailed use of 
pesticides. Simple labels do not maximize potential benefits because, by not providing enough detail, they 
do not allow consumers to adequately rank competing products by key attributes (Roe et al. 2001, Teisl 
and O’Brien 2001). Such attribute-level ranking can be an important intermediate input into the consumer 
choice process (Lee and Geistfeld 1998). To avoid confusion, it is likely that any labeling program for 
GMFs will require a significant information campaign to educate consumers. 
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The costs of GM labeling programs are highly variable. At one end of the spectrum are voluntary 
labeling programs for GMF or non-GMFs, where companies set up segregation or IP systems that ensure 
label integrity for specific product flows. The price of the labeling and underlying quality assurance 
systems will be reflected in the product price. At the other end of the spectrum is mandatory labeling of 
all GMFs (broadly defined) and non-GMFs (narrowly defined), verified through IP systems with full 
traceability. Here all producers and consumers will bear the costs of labeling and related quality 
assurance. In practice, we currently see variants of these policies, with the U.S. pursuing voluntary 
labeling primarily of non-GMFs and the EU, Japan, and Australia/New Zealand pursuing mandatory 
labeling of GMFs. In this context it is impossible to talk generally about the costs of GM labeling since 
the costs are so dependent on how the program is specified. 
Without international trade, it might be possible to say “to each his own” regarding GM labeling 
policy. In this case, each country would and could make its own judgment about the relative benefits and 
costs of labeling policies. The FDA approach might be viewed as appropriate for the U.S., while the EU 
approach is appropriate for Europe, the Japanese approach is appropriate for Japan, and so on. With 
international trade, however, it is inevitable that GM labeling policy will serve to advantage or 
disadvantage different producers in different countries, resulting in deep conflict. If systems diverge even 
more than they currently do, as would occur with the EC’s proposed traceability policy, then conflict will 
become even stronger. It is unclear whether WTO rules will be able to contain this conflict. The on-going 
struggle between proponents and opponents of GM labeling, both within countries and at the international 
level, make the analysis of the benefits and costs of these programs particularly important. In the absence 
of better analysis, the war of rhetoric will hold sway. 
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